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QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF POPULATION
CONTROL: EUGENICS AND EUTHENICS
Fm DucK OsBoRNz*
A visitor from outer space, considering our planet today, might well conclude that
the most important recent development of man's activities on earth was his control
of deaths and his control of births. These two interrelated phenomena between them
determine man's numbers and in many ways affect his quality. On anything like
their present scale, they are of very recent origin.
Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, an average length of life of
thirty-five to forty years may have been common in various localities among civilized
nations. By igoi, expectation of life in Massachusetts had risen to over forty-six
years for men and forty-nine years for women. Today in the United States, it is
over sixty-seven years for men and over seventy-two years for women.'
The first widespread practice of fertility control took place in France in the
early part of the nineteenth century, but it was not until the Bradlaugh-Besant trials
in England in i877' that "antifertility" practices became widely used and began to
gain public acceptance. Today in the United States, according to the most recent
studies, over eighty-five per cent of married women practice some form of fertility
control, and births have fallen to 2.3 per woman of completed fertility in x958, as
compared to five per woman at the turn of the century Similar changes have
more recently taken place in the Soviet Union and even more recently in Japan.4
But in the rest of the world, the picture is very different. By the use of serums,
antibiotics, and insecticides, death rates can now be dramatically reduced, as they
have been in Ceylon, Malaya, the Caribbean area, Venezuela, and Chile. These
countries experienced in less than a decade a decline in death rates that it took the
western world half a century to achieve. But while death rates are going down
*A.B. 191o, Princeton University; post grad. study x9xi-i2, Trinity College, Cambridge, Eng.; LL.D.
1943, Washington & Lee University; LL.D. 1947, Washington & Jefferson College; Sc.D. 1942, Norwich
University; Litt.D. '945, New York University. Chairman, Executive Committee, The Population
Council, Inc. Author, [with Frank Lorimer] Dvmiics oF POPULATION (1934); PRIEFACE TO EUoENICs
(1940). Editor, G. C. SCHWESINGER, HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT (1933). Contributor to population
periodicals.
'LoUIs 1. DuBLIN, ALFRED J. LoTxA & MORTIMER SPIEGELMAN, LENGTH OF LIFE 56, 65 (rev. ed.
1949).
aR. v. Bradlaugh & Besant, 2 Q.B.D. 569 (1877), rev'd, 3 Q.B.D. 607 (C.A. 1878).
RON.ALD FREEaDMAN, PASCAL K. WHFLPTON & ARTHUR A. CAMPBELL, FAMILY PLANNING, STERILITY,
AND POPULATION GROWTH 64 (1959).
'U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRs, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBoox 211, 215 (U.N. Pub,
Sales No. 1958, XIII. x).
EUGENICS AND EuTHENICS 407
rapidly in some areas, and at a slower tempo in others, birth rates in the under-
developed regions of the world remain at medieval levels.
As a result of the widening gap between births and deaths in the economically
underdeveloped countries, we are faced with rapid changes in the proportion of
peoples brought up in different cultures, as is evident from table one. According to
these United Nations estimates, the proportion of Europeans to the total world
population is likely to go down in fifty years from 15.7 per cent to nine per cent, the
proportion of Russians from 7.2 per cent to six per cent, the proportion of North
Americans from 8.8 per cent to 8.i per cent, while the proportion of Asians is ex-
pected to increase by 11.5 per cent and the proportion of South Americans by forty
per cent. This is in great contrast to the changes that took place during the previous
3o0 years, when people of European descent increased sevenfold as against a four-
fold increase for the rest of the world.
TABLE I
GRowTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD POPULATION
Medium EstimatesArea 1950 1975 2000
World total (millions) ......... 2500 8830 6280
Percentage Distriution
Africa ...................... 8.0 7.9 8.2
North America ............... 8.8 8.8 8.1
South America ................ 4.5 5.3 6.3
Asia (except U.S.S.R.) ......... 55.2 57.7 61.6
Europe (except U.S.S.R.) ...... 15.7 12.4 9.0
Oceania ...................... .5 .5 .5
U.S.S.R ...................... 7.2 7.2 6.0
SooRCE: U.N. DrpeoF FCoNomc Am SOCIAL AnAxms, Tn" FurunE GRownr or Woxa, PoPoLATio table I(B), at 70,71 (ST/SOA/
Ser.A/28) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1958. XII. 2).
In so far as different cultures give their people different qualities and social values,
these changes in proportionate numbers are changes in the quality of the whole.
They are brought about by the present uneven spread of death control and birth
control throughout world populations. It seems likely that birth rates will eventually
go down among all the world's peoples, as they have already among the people of
the more industrialized countries. The present large variations in rates of increase
would then become matters of historical interest. But other trends in population
might still be having an important part in determining the quality of people every-
where.
TIE ExTEr To WHICH POPULATION TRwNs MAY DEvmdNE QUALITY
The quality of the people in any community or nation is determined by a number
of factors, which include cultural and environmental influences, the kind of homes
the children are brought up in, the kind of parents who bring them up, and the
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genetic factors derived from the parents. Each of these conditions may be affected
by population trends-that is, by trends in rate of growth, mating habits, differential
death and birth rates, and migration. A rapid rate of growth may make it more
difficult to provide educational facilities, provide cultural and recreational opportuni-
ties, and expand production; mating habits may affect the rate of growth, or modify
genetic and cultural inheritance; differential fertility may increase the number of
people in particular racial, social, or occupational groups; differences in size of
family between couples with different personal qualities will affect the proportion
of people with similar qualities in the next generation, since people tend to be like
their parents; and both internal and external migration may affect quality in many
ways. The relative importance of these different influences is not easily assessed.
It must vary with every change in circumstance.
A. Less-Industrialized Countries
The concern of society for improving the quality of our people is expressed chiefly
in expenditure for education, public health, housing, recreational facilities, and other
things outside the home. The extent of advances in these fields may be greatly
affected by the rate of population growth. If population is increasing more rapidly
than production, as is the case in a number of countries today, per capita income
is reduced and the level of living declines. Each year there are fewer goods avail-
able per person, and quite evidently it is harder to find the money for education
and other cultural needs. Further, when a population is growing rapidly, the
proportion of children is high and the proportion of the labor force low as com-
pared to the proportions in a static population. In the United States in 1940, following
on the low birth rates during the depression, there was one child under fourteen years
of age to every three adults (twenty-five per cent to seventy-five per cent); by com-
parison, in i88o, when the population was growing rapidly, the proportion was two
children to every three adults (38.1 per cent to 61.9 per cent), a proportion similar
to that in India todayY
In a highly productive economy like that of the United States, these differences
are not of major importance. There is plenty of margin for improving educational
and other facilities if the people really want it done. But in a country like India,
where the barest necessities are hard to come by, a low proportion of people in
the labor force and a high proportion of mouths to feed may be a serious handicap
to any accumulation of capital and to improving educational and other facilities, a
handicap so serious as to make it extremely difficult, if not quite impossible, for a
country with a low per capita productivity to pull itself up by its own bootstraps.
Coale and Hoover, in a recent study of economic trends in India, came to the
following conclusions, after taking into account the rapid advances in agriculture
and manufacture that may be expected in the next thirty years: If there are con-
52 U.S. BUREAU OF TE CENSUS, DEP'T OF CommCE, x950 CENsus op POPULATION pt. I, table 39
(1953).
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tinued declines in mortality, but no decline in fertility, the population of India
should reach 775,000,000 by 1986, and by then, average income per consumer would
be growing at a rate of less than one per cent per year. If the declining mortality
were accompanied by a fifty per cent decline in fertility between 1956 and i98i, the
population of India should reach 590,000,000 by 1986, and average income per con-
sumer would then be forty per cent higher than that attained under the high-fertility
assumption and rising at the rate of 34 per cent per year
Such considerations have led to the widely-held theory that rapid increases in
population are a serious handicap to economic growth, in countries of low productiv-
ity, such as India. This is not to say that new ideas do not spread in an under-
developed economy. Modern methods of communication and transportation are
helping to change the attitudes and aspirations of the world's peoples at a fantastic
rate, and at little cost. But educational and cultural facilities are not growing as
fast, and in this respect, rapid growth in a weak economy is undoubtedly a retarding
factor. It may, therefore, be worth while to look at rates of population increase
among some of the world's people for their effect on increases in production and
thus on the accumulation of educational and cultural facilities.
TABLE II
WORLD POPULATION AND RATES OF INCREASE
Annual Rate Annual Rates /1000 Population
of Increase (1953-57 average) Population, U. 1N.
Area (1953-57 aver- 1959 Estimates, 2000
age percentage) Births Deaths (millions) (millions)
World total ........... 1.6 34 18 2896 6280
Africa ................ 1.8 45 27 234 517
North America ........ 1.6 25 9 196 312
Central America ....... 2.6 41 15 65 198
South America ......... 2.3 39 16 134 394
Asia (except U.S.S.R.).. 1.8 39 21 1621 3870
Europe(except U.S.S.R.) 0.8 19 11 421 568
Oceania ............... 1.6 25 9 16 29.3
U.S.S.R ............... 1.8 25 7 209 379
SouacEs: U.N. DEP'T or Ecomic A.o SoczAL AFFSArs, Dzmo(JoAmc YR~nBoor table 2, at 104 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1958. XII. 1);
U.N. DEP'T oy EcoNoic AN SoctAL A-F A.S, Tm FUra GaRowTH oF Woa PoRuLAnou (ST/SOA/Ser.A/28) (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 195 XIIL 2); U.S.S.IR C-!nzr STATI cCAL AsmwmTR&TTzoe, TEE Eeooxa or E U.S.S.R. e 1958 (1959), as reported in the
N.Y. Times, Oet. 16, 1959, p. 2, col 3.
From the figures in table two, it is clear that the most rapid increases in num-
bers are presently taking place in areas that have a minimum of industrial plant
and a culture and level of training that will make technical improvement a slow
process. Death rates are still high in these areas, and as they go down, population
will increase even more rapidly than at present, until there is a corresponding fall in
births. It is in such areas that rapid population growth may be considered a serious
handicap to improving levels of living. Many people believe that the problems thus
created are among the most important facing the world today.
'ANSLEY J. COALE & EDGAR M. HoovER, POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
Low-INCOME CouNTRiEs 284, 286 (1958).
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B. United States
i. The effect of growth in numbers
In the United States, the present rate of increase is fairly high, about x.5 per cent
a year, about the same as the increase now taking place in India. But the conditions
are very different. Our land is not crowded, as is India's. Our low death rate,
which is attributable in part to the present age distribution of the population, will
go up as the proportion of old people increases. We are heavily industrialized, and
technological improvements are taking place at a cumulative rate, so that productive
capacity is quite sure to increase at a faster rate than population. Economists seem
to be divided in their opinions as to the effect of population growth under these
conditions. Some feel that it has a retarding effect on the improvement of levels of
living. Others hold that growth is a stimulus to enlargement of plant and a psycho-
logical stimulus to increased economic activity, and is hence on the whole beneficial.
Whatever the true answer, it seems to the present writer that current rates of
increase are not likely to continue indefinitely in this country. The baby boom
started at the end of World War II, following a continuous decline in births over
the past hundred years, as is shown in table three. The boom was magnified by
a high marriage rate to make up the gap during the war and by a decline in age at
marriage. Any deterioration of economic conditions might well see a return to the
lower prewar birth rates, such as has occurred in Europe since 1955.
TABLE III
UNITED STATES RATEs OF GROWTH, i79o-i96o
Increase over Average Annual Rate
Year U.S. Population Previous Decade during Previous Decade
(thousands) (percentage) (percentage)
1800 ............................. 5,308 35.1 3.1
1830 ............................. 12,866 33.5 2.9
1860 ............................. 31,443 35.6 3.2
1890 ............................. 62,948 25.5 2.3
1910 ............................. 91,972 21.0 1.9
1920 ............................. 105,711 14.9 1.4
1930 ............................. 122,775 16.1 1.5
1940 ............................. 131,669 7.2 0.7
1950 ............................. 151,132 14.5 1.4
1960 ............................. 179,000 18.4 1.7
SouacEs: U.S. BunEAu or THE CENSus, DEP'T oF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATIsTCs or Tuz UurrED SrAsn, 1789-1045. at 25 (192);
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Ser. P-25, No. 213, Feb. 24, 19060.
During the period i8oo to the present, the death rate per thousand population fell
gradually from about twenty-five' to 94, The birth rate fell somewhat later.
Between 191o and ig5o, the average number of children ever born to white women
forty-five to forty-nine years of age declined from 4.1 to 2.3, and that for nonwhite
7WnsoLN H. GRABILL, CLYDE V. KISER & PASCAL K. WHELPTOmJ, THE FERTILITY or AMERICAN VoM.N
7 (1958).
8 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Feb. x96o, p. I.
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women declined from 5.9 to 2.7.P Then almost before World War II was over,
came the baby boom, a phenomenon that took place mostly in the white-collar
groups that had had the lowest birth rates during the depression. Among the rural
and lower-income groups, whose large families had contributed a large proportion
of the growth in previous decades, the proportion of families of five or six or more
continued to fall.
In the twenty-five-year period covered in table four, the proportion of fifth
and higher order births fell from 26.3 per cent to fifteen per cent of all births, and
the proportion of eighth and higher births fell by more than half. The table does
not tell the final story, however, for the women who completed their childbearing in
1958 at forty-four years of age had, in most cases, been married during the depression
and were affected by the baby-boom psychology only as they were reaching the age of
thirty. They are the most recent cohort for which completed birth figures are
available. Analysis of the birth rates for younger women married in the postwar
years indicates an increase in second, third, and fourth births and a possible increase
in fifth births before childbearing is completed, but a continuous decline in births
of six or more.
TABLE IV
UNITED STATES CUmULATIVE BIRTHS PER i,OOO WOMEN AGED 44 YEARS, 1933-58
Women Born in:
1914 1909 1904 1899 1894 1889
Total births ............... 2324.7 2220.2 2382.0 2607.9 2899.6 3152.9
Birth order Percentage of Total
First & second ........... 60.3 59.5 57.0 53.0 50.1 46.6
Third & fourth .......... 24.7 24.0 24.4 25.7 26.5 27.1
Fifth & higher ........... 15.0 16.5 18.6 21.3 23.4 26.3
Fifth ................ 5.4 5.6 6.2 6.9 7.4 8.1
Sixth ................ 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.9 5.3 5.9
Seventh .............. 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.3 3.7 4.1
Eighth & over ........ 4.0 4.7 5.4 6.2 7.0 8.2
Year of attaining age 44 ...... 1958 1953 1948 1943 1938 1933
SOuncE: U.S. DEP' oa HEAIum, EDUCATION, A D WEILARE, 51 VnAL STATISTICS, SPrciui, REPORTS, NO. 1, FzrLIT TABsES FOR
Bwu ConoRTs or AmENiCAw WO ME table 4 (1960).
If the growth rate of recent years continues through the next century, the United
States could have a population of iooo,oooooo by 2050. But such an event seems
unlikely. Birth rates will probably level off, but the United States seems headed
for a population of about .4o,oooooo by i98o,1° and may even reach 300,000,000 in
another forty years.' Even such an increase should not seriously threaten our
level of living or our ability to provide educational and cultural facilities, provided
' GRABIL, KIsER & WHELPTON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 46.
"U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Ser. P-25, No. 187,
Nov. 10, 1958, p. 16.
"
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our people put some limit on their consumption of consumer goods. Many people
think life will not be so attractive in so crowded a country and fear for our educa-
tional, political, and cultural institutions under such a piling up of population. These
apprehensions will certainly not diminish if we begin to approach the 6oooooooo
or iooooooooo people for whom our area could provide a good sustenance.
2. The effect of birth differentials between occupational, socioeconomic, and rural-
urban groups
Various aspects of quality are represented by the farmer and the city dweller,
by the college graduate and the person who has had only three years of grade school,
by the laborer, the mechanic, and the executive, and by those with good incomes
and those at the bottom of the economic scale. Differences in the birth rates of
such groups have attracted much interest for the changes they may make in the
proportions of each type in succeeding generations. It is hard to deny the possibility
that such differentials may have an important effect, for the children of the more-
educated, professional, and higher-income classes reach positions of leadership far
more frequently than might be expected from their number. But our great social
mobility, the constant rise in our level of living, the educational opportunities open
to all who are qualified, may mask the effect of fertility differentials.
There is much evidence that in earliest times, the rural populations increased
more rapidly than those in the cities, partly perhaps because of the higher death
rates in the cities. But for the past fifty years, death rates have not varied to any
great degree between city and country or between occupational groups. Births are
now almost the only factor in the increase or decline of various groups of the
population. Further, many major studies in recent years have made it clear that
differences in fertility between large groups of the population are not attributable to
differences in fecundity-i., in the ability to have children-but are attributable
almost wholly to the voluntary control of fertility.
TABLE V
CHILDREN BORN IN THE UNITED STATES PER I0 WIvEs AGED 40-44 YEARS BY
BROAD OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES, 1910
Rates for Ratio of Each Class to
Occupational Class Each Class Total Urban or Rural
Urban sample ............... 249 100
Professional ............... 211 85
Business & clerical ........... 224 90
Skilled manual .............. 277 111
Unskilled manual ............ 334 134
Rural sample .................. 402 100
Farm owners ................ 376 94
Farm renters ................ 467 116
Farm laborers ............... 471 117
SouRcE: Adapted from Sydenstricker & Notestein, Differential Fertility According to Social Class, 25 J. Am. SrTr. Ass' 24, 25 (1030)
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As is seen in table five, urban wives who had completed their childbearing by
x91o had produced only sixty-two per cent of the number of children born to rural
wives; the wives of professional and business men, less than half the number born
to the wives of farm renters and farm laborers. Between i9io and i94o, birth
rates fell in all these groups, but there was no great change in differentials between
the classes until the end of World War II. Immediately following the war, birth
rates went up rapidly, but chiefly among the white-collar classes, who had most
limited their rate of births during the depression. The manual unskilled labor
group, rural and urban, showed no comparable increase. Women married during
the baby boom have not yet completed their period of fertility, but recent data indi-
cate a considerable narrowing of differentials, as is shown in table six.
TABLE VI
CHILDREN BORN IN THE UNITED STATES PER I0 WIVES AGED :15-44
BY RESIDENCE AND OccUtATIoN, 1957
1975 IntragroupStanding
Status Unstand- Standardized 
1950
ardized for Agea 1957a 1950
Residence
Urban ............................. 204 201 163 100 100
Rural nonfarm ...................... 236 233 214 116 132
Rural farm ......................... 301 293 265 146 163
1952 1957 1952
Husband's occupation
Professional & technical ............. 200 194 165 64 61
Farmers & farm managers ........... 315 302 270 100 100
Managers & proprietors (except farm).. 221 209 176 69 65,
Clerical ............................ 188 192 157 64 58
Sales .............................. 206 203 154 67 57
Craftsmen ......................... 233 228 193 75 71
Service (including private household).. 228 223 181 76 67
Farm laborers & foremen ............ 373 - - - -
Laborers (except farm & mine) ....... 265 270 238 89 88
No=: - Standardized by age distribution of earlier period for comparison.
Sounc: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Ser. P-20, No. 84, Aug. 8, 1958, tables 4 and S.
During the past fifteen years, the country has been seeing the cumulative effect
of those forces that are dulling the lines between "urban" and "nonurban" peoples.
and tending to produce a single type of urbanized society, all subject to the same
kinds of environmental pressures and exhibiting the same kind of social behavior..
This process is not yet complete, and the period since 1945 is too short for decisive
figures on the change in fertility rates. Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell, in their
recent book, Family Planning, Sterility, and Population Growth, indicate their belief
that12
12 FREEDMAN ET AL., op. cit. supra note 3, at 273.
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in the United States we now seem to have reached a phase of demographic evolution
where fertility differentials are smaller than they were a few decades ago. Some of the
differentials such as those associated with income, education, and place of residence, even
show signs of disappearing.
Their findings indicated that couples with annual incomes of $7,000 or more had had
2.3 children and were expected to end up with 2.9. Couples with annual incomes
under $3,000 had had 2.0 children and were expected by the end of childbearing to
have 3.2. Seventy-nine per cent of those with annual incomes over $6,ooo were
using contraception at the time of the survey. Those with annual incomes under
$3,000 were younger, and only fifty-eight per cent were using contraception. 8
Future trends are hard to forecast, and we may better consider the actual situation
of the 62,500,000 children under eighteen who are living in the United States today.
Of these children, all but something less than i,oooooo live with their 26,500,000
families. (There are an additional x7,7ooooo families with no children.) Some
25,600,000 (41.6 per cent) of these children are in families of one or two children;
24,000,000 (thirty-nine per cent) are in families with three or four children; and
12,000,000 (194 per cent) are in larger families of five or more children. The families
with more than two children are at progressively lower income levels according as
they have three, four, five, or six or more children, as is shown in table seven.
TABLE VII
DisnaBuTioN ol' CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATEs, I958
FAwLEs CmDRE N
Cmz'RxEN PER F&iLy Number Percentage lumber Percentage MEDIAN 1958
(thousands) of Total (thousands) of Total FuLr INcouM
0 ......................... 17,714 40.1 0 0 -
18......................... ,771 19.8 8,771 14.2 $5288
2....................... 8,410 19.0 16,820 27.4 5580
3 ......................... 4,844 11.0 14,532 23.6 5451
4......................... 2,376 5.4 9,504 15.4 5042
5 ......................... 1,102 2.5 5,510 8.9 4430
6 or more ................. 985 2.2 6,480 10.5 3481
Total .................. 44,202 100.0 61,617 100.0 $5123
Souac= U.S. Bureau of the Ceasus, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reportz, Ser. P-6O, No. 33, Jan. 15, 1060, tablo 0.
Table eight, which is more detailed, indicates that in 1958, there were 3,200,000
children in families whose annual income was under $i,ooo, and an additional
io,5oo,ooo in families whose annual income was between $x,ooo and $3,ooo. A total
of i3,5oooo, or twenty-three per cent of all our children, were brought up in families
with annual incomes below $3,0o0. A third of these children were in families with
five or more children. At the other extreme, only eleven per cent of the 5,2ooooo
children whose families have an annual income of $Io,ooo or more are in families of
five or more children. Fifty-eight per cent of the two-child families had annual
"I1d. at 124, 296.
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TABLE VIII
DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES BY FAMILY INCOME, 1958
ALL CHILDREN TOTAL AN.NUAL INCOM PER FAMILY
UNDER 18
LrxvxG WITH
FAMIIES Under $1000 $1000-3000 $300045000 $500047000 $7000 & Over
CHILDREN PER FAMILY
e -z -:. U,. :a.- 2
1 ..................... 8,771 14.2 421 13.1 1,465 14.0 2,184 13.6 2,193 13.2 2,503 16.4
2 ..................... 16,820 27.4 572 17.9 2,0856 19.9 4,322 26.9 4,928 29.7 4,912 32.1
3 ..................... 14,532 23.6 597 18.6 1,947 18.6 3,735 23.2 4,374 26.4 3,879 25.4
4 ..................... 9,504 15.4 448 14.0 1,652 15.8 2,595 16.1 2,640 15.9 2,168 14.2
5 ..................... 5,510 8.9 460 14.4 1,205 11.5 1,525 9.5 1,355 8.2 965 6.3
6 or more .............. 6,400 10.5 706 22.0 2,120 20.2 1,720 10.7 1,085 6.5 849 5.6
Total .............. 61,617 100.0 3,204 100.0 10,475 100.0 16,082 100.0 16,575 100.0 15,281 100.0
Percentage of total ..... 10.0 5.2 17.0 26.1 26.9 24.8
SouRCe: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Ser. P-60, No. 33, Jan. 15,1060, table 6.
incomes of $5,000 or more, and fifty-seven per cent of the three-child families were
in this category, while sixty-three per cent of the families with five or more children
had annual incomes below $3,ooo. For the country as a whole, the smaller the
family income, the larger the number of children among whom it must be divided.
Adequate income is not by any means the only thing necessary for rearing chil-
dren, but a really inadequate income is almost certain to hamper their physical
growth and provide insufficient stimulus to mental growth. Several attempts have
been made to determine the cost of "minimum but adequate" levels of living. The
best known is the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics' City Worker's Budget,
representing a "modest but adequate" level of living to ensure health, efficiency,
social participation, and self-respect for a husband aged thirty-eight, his wife, a son
of thirteen, and a daughter of eight. The Bureau is in the process of bringing this
budget up to date, since it was compiled on the basis of prewar standards and was
last priced in thirty-four major cities in October 195i. By applying the increase in.
the Consumer Price Index since October 1951, however, the figure of almost $5,ooo
is the minimum annual income required in any urban area to provide for a family
of four, including two children, adequately but modestly, even on the prewar
standard.
Table eight indicates that 48.3 per cent of the children are in families where the
1958 annual income was under $5,0oo. Of course, many of these are rural families
whose cash requirements are considerably less than those of urban dwellers. By
assuming that all the 8,ooooo farm children are in families of 1958 annual income
under $5,ooo, we find there are at least 1o,500,ooo urban and rural nonfarm children
living in families of three or more children where the 1958 annual income was
under $5,000. For at least twenty per cent of the nation's children, therefore, the
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family income is inadequate, while at the same time, the adults with whom the
children have contact in the home have, in most cases, a very limited educational
attainment.
Very little is known about average differences in genetic inheritance between
different economic and social classes. The subject has had much attention, and
the results are inconclusive. There is at present no sufficient scientific basis for be-
lieving that the higher birth rates of the people in the lower-income groups (but not
including the socially inadequate) are causing a genetic deterioration from one
generation to another. These children, however, contribute far less than their pro-
portions to the skills and leadership of their generation. Whether their relative
inadequacy has environmental or genetic origins or results from a combination of
both, their social contribution is less than that of children born and brought up in
homes at a higher income level. To this extent at least, the present effect of popula-
tion control is injurious to quality.
3. The role of personal characteristics of intelligence, personality, character, and health
Even more than with group differences, the quality of the population might be
much affected by differences in size of family as between couples of varying personal
qualities. The personal characteristics of individuals, their health, their intelligence,
their personality and character tend to be like those of their parents. There are
many exceptions, of course, because different genetic types within the same families
may react very differently to the same home environment. But the general sim-
ilarity of children to their parents has been confirmed by many studies. Tyler says,
"'Practically all investigators agree that the intra family correlations for intelligence
test scores are of a magnitude comparable to those for structural physical traits.
They center around .5o for both characteristics."' 4  In summarizing an exhaustive
study of the work in this field in the past forty years, Anastasi says,15
Correlations between tests of siblings cluster around .50. In personality characteristics,
correlations are somewhat lower. Husband-wife correlations tend to follow a similar
pattern. Available evidence indicates that such marital correlations result largely from
assortative mating rather than from common experiences and mutual influence of the
spouses after marriage.
Since children tend to be like their parents, any difference in the number of
children born to parents of different types will correspondingly change the proportion
of people having those qualities in the next generation. For the purpose of the
study of the effect of population control on quality, it does not matter whether the
quality is one which is almost wholly determined by heredity-as, for instance,
eye color-or whether the quality is one that varies with training-as, for instance,
intelligence as shown by intelligence tests; the result is the same, since the qualities
are passed on to the next generation.
14 LEoxA E. TYLri, THE PSYCHOLOGY op HuMAN DIFFERENCEs 484 (z956).
" A. ANASrAS, DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY 309 (1958).
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Personal qualities of intelligence, personality, health, and vitality are widely scat-
tered throughout the population. They are not part of a culture pattern, in the
sense that rural, urban, and occupational groups represent particular culture types,
but they are spread widely through every type of culture. These qualities are
more enduring than culture patterns. In our American society, people change easily
and in great numbers from one occupational or social group to another, but the
personal qualities of their parents are likely to stay with them for life. These
qualities are more important than culture patterns, because these qualities maintain
the best in the culture and are capable of evolving new and higher cultures. Many
people believe that civilizations rise and fall according to the proportion they contain
of people of high intelligence, fine personality, strong character, and good health.
If the control of births affects these proportions, it would be wisdom for us to know
that it does, and to know in what way it affects them.
Unfortunately, very little is known about the distribution of births according
to the personal characteristics of the parents. These qualities are hard to measure,
and to measure them in a large enough number of people to make up an adequate
sample of the total population is exceedingly expensive. This is in great contrast
to the ease with which demographers study trends among occupational groups,
whose numbers are neatly listed by the census.
a. Fertility at the upper levels of quality. At the upper levels of quality, there
are several classifications available that have been studied at different intervals and
from which we may derive an indication of the trends resulting from the present
widespread control of births. Men and women are listed in Who's Who because
they have achieved something that in our form of society is considered important.
The student of trends in births does not in this case have to make judgments on
questions of quality; they have been made for him by the judgment of society. In
a recent study of the number of children of men in Who's Who, Kirk found that
"the fertility of younger men in Who's Who is probably now equal to or above the
national average of the white population"; for the whole group, completed fertility
is about at the replacement level.16 This is in marked contrast to the results of a
similar study made thirty years agoj 7 At that time, the national birth rate was much
higher than at present, but the completed fertility of men in Who's Who was about
half that needed for replacement. Today's Who's Who men show a remarkable
homogeneity with respect to marriage and family size. Almost all who have been
married (ninety-four per cent have been married at least once) have had two- or
three-child families. Differential factors are: i) religion, and 2) negative relation
between fertility and social mobility.
Graduation from college is another classification that is available and has been
used by demographers. It is not as good as listing in Who's Who, because chance
"
8 fDudley Kirk, Fertility of a Gifted Group: A Study of the Number of Children of Men in "Who's
Who," in MILBANK MEMiORIAL FUND 1956 ANNUAL CONFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS 78, 87, 84 (957).
"
7 E. HUNTINGTON & L. F. WHITNEY, THE BUILDERS OF AmEICA 167 (1927).
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and money are bigger factors in getting to college than they are in getting into
Who's Who. Nevertheless, college graduates probably have, on the average, more
of thes'qualities we are now considering than have the general run of the popula-
tion. In a comparison of graduates of 1930 with those of 1945, Lauriat found that
more of the recent graduates are marrying and higher proportions are having second
and third children within ten years of graduation than among the earlier graduates."'
Ten years after marriage, the younger college women had a higher average number
of children than did the older women twenty-five years after graduation. This
would indicate a real increase in completed family for the younger group.
Recent figures for number of children born to couples with husband and wife at
different educational levels are shown in table nine. Compared to the situation that
existed thirty years ago, this table shows a remarkable change. Among couples in
which both husband and wife have had at least one year of college education, over
thirty-six per cent have had three or more children, a figure remarkably close to the
forty-five per cent for couples neither of whom had more than eight years of grade
school. The increase in the fertility of couples at higher educational levels may be
due to the baby boom and may be temporary. But the decline in births among
couples with grade school education appears to be permanent.
A number of small studies have been made of people at the higher educational
levels, relating their fertility to some criteria of success. Table ten gives a sample
of such studies at the college level, "success" being defined by the judgment of their
TABLE IX
EDUCAIONAL LEv Ls OF MARRIED COUPLES IN THE UNITED STATES,
HUSBAND AGED 30-44 YEARS, 1957
Percentage by Educational Level
of Couples with:
Educational Level Couples Percentage(thou- of Total 0 1 2 3 or More
sands) Group Children Child Children Children
Husband: Elementary, 0-8 years .... 3,807 100.0 16.5 17.1 25.0 41.4
Wife: Elementary, 0-8 years ...... 1,924 50.5 18.5 15.3 21.5 44.6
High School or College ..... 1,883 49.5 14.5 18.8 28.6 38.1
Husband: High School, 1-4 years .... 7,590 100.0 13.5 20.4 32.0 34.1
Wife: Elementary, 0-8 years ...... 899 11.8 13.8 20.1 28.1 37.0
High School, 1-4 years ..... 6,044 79.6 13.3 20.5 32.4 33.8
College, I year or more .... 647 8.5 15.6 19.8 32.9 31.7
Husband: College, I year or more .... 2,933 100.0 13.5 16.3 35.0 35.2
Wife: Elementary, 0-8 years ...... 80 2.7 17.5 26.2 30.0 26.2
High School, 1-4 years ..... 1,479 50.4 12.8 17.7 34.9 34.6
College, 1 year or more .... 1,374 46.8 14.0 14.1 35.5 36.4
Education not reported ............ 132
Total ............................ 14,462
Soxce: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Ser. P-20, No. 83, Aug. 4. 1958, table 13.
1 8Lauriat, Marriage and Fertility Patterns of College Graduates, 6 EUGENICS Q. 171 (x959)-
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TABLE X
FERTILITY DIFFERENTALS AMONG GRADUATES OF HARVARD, PRINCETON, AND YALE
Average Average
Number Number Percentage
Degree of Success Number Percentage Children Children per Childless
of Cases Married per Man Married Man Couples
Harvard Men
(High) 1 .................... 120 93 2.02 2.17 19
2 .................... 430 87 1.76 2.05 18
3 .................... 735 87 1.54 1.78 23
4 .................... 473 72 1.03 1.43 36
(Low) 5 .................... 131 58 0.74 1.28 38
Princeton Men
(High) 1 .................... 338 93.0 1.97 2.14 15.7
2 .................... 366 86.7 1.56 1.80 18.9
(Low) 3 .................... 54 66.8 1.09 1.64 22.2
Yale Men
(High) 1 .................... 140 92.85 2.27 2.44 17.69
2 .................... 139 85.70 1.78 2.08 16.80
3 .................... 138 83.35 1.63 1.95 20.00
4 .................... 138 83.35 1.33 1.60 32.17
(Low) 5 .................... 137 66.45 .86 1.29 40.66
SOURCE: FEDERICK OsBoRN, PEFACE To EuEmCS 175 (2d ed. 1951).
classmates. Many questions can be raised about the methodology of these studies,
but they were made quite independently and it is interesting to note the similarity of
the results.
In 1955, Gutman and Bender made a study of ninety-five married graduates of
the class of 194o at Dartmouth.'9 Within fifteen years of their graduation from
college, these married graduates had an average of 2.43 children and many years
of fecund life ahead of them. In reply to the question, what they considered their
ideal family size, and assuming that the stated ideal represented their own plans,
the average size of the intended family was 3.14.
While in college, these men had been rated by their instructors and other educa-
tional personnel for five groups of personality traits. In 1955, coefficients of correla-
tion were worked out showing the degree of association between number of children
and the selected independent variables of personality. Only one of these variables
appeared to be significantly related to fertility; for the degree of extroversion, the
correlation was .4815. But the extroversion score was available for only forty
respondents.
Studies of this sort are of considerable interest, but they are too limited and too
small, even in the aggregate, to be accepted for more than an indication of possible
trends.
The practice of fertility control has been general among the more-educated people
in this country for a much longer period of time than among the less-educated.
Findings on the present fertility of the more-educated may be somewhat more indi-
"g Gutman & Bender, Some Sources of Variation in the Family Size of College Graduates, 35 MILBANK
MEMOaRIA FUN Q. 287 (1957).
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cative of permanent trends than are findings on the fertility of the less-educated. But
such an assumption is hazardous in view of the postwar psychology and the great
prosperity of the postwar years that were concomitant with the upsurge in births
among the white-collar classes. We do not know how fertility would stand up in
a period of depression. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the lower-
educational, the lower-income, and the lower-occupational groups have not yet
accepted the practice of birth control, or if they have, their practice tends to be
ineffective. If, as seems likely, the practice continues to spread, and if improved means
of fertility control are developed, we might expect a further narrowing or even
reversal of the differentials now favoring the least-educated.
No survey of this field would be complete if it did not touch on Terman's study
of gifted children. ° In 1921, Terman and his associates picked something over 1500
children from the grade and high schools of certain larger California cities who, on
the basis of their ability to pass intelligence tests, ranked in the top one per cent
of the population of the schools. This gifted group has since been studied at five-year
intervals, the last study having been made in x955, when they were about forty-five
years old. Classified by parentage, twenty-nine per cent were the children of pro-
fessional people, a group who constituted only 2.9 per cent of the total population.
Twenty per cent were the children of skilled laborers, a group who constituted 57.7
per cent of the population. When they grew up, 45.6 per cent of the gifted had
become professional people by the age of forty-five-lawyers, teachers, judges, doctors,
school and college administrators. They maintained their intellectual superiority;
they led unusually normal and successful lives; they earned high incomes; they
married superior wives; they have at least the average number of children for
people in their income class. Their 2,452 children have an average I.Q. of 132.7, as
against an average score of 151 for the gifted.
Terman's study lends justification for the use of intelligence tests as criteria of
socially useful qualities and offers encouraging indications that gifted people do not
fail to reproduce.
b. Fertility within the middle group. In the past two decades, three major studies
have been undertaken at a cost in excess of $Ioo,ooo each to determine the differences
in fertility practices and levels by social, economic, cultural, and psychological factors.
The first of these was the Indianapolis fertility survey, conducted in 1941 under the
auspices of the Milbank Memorial Fund.2' One of its purposes was to test certain
hypotheses on the relation of social and psychological factors to fertility planning,
status, and size of planned family. The study was based on a stratified sample of the
41,498 native-white-Protestant couples in Indianapolis with the following character-
istics: the marriage had occurred in the period 1927-29, when the wife was under
201 L. M. TEEmAN ET AL., GENETIC STUDIES OF GENIUS [MENTAL AND PHYSICAL TRAITS 01 A
THOUSAND GIFTED CHILDREN] (1925).
21 Kiser & Whelpton, Sodal and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility: Summary of Chi/f Finding:
and Implications for Future Studies, 36 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 282 (1958).
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thirty years of age; each spouse had been married only once; each had at least an
eighth-grade education; and the couple had lived most of its married life in a large
city. The field study was made at the end of the depression, a period in which
birth rates were the lowest in our history.
The findings indicated the traditional inverse or negative association of socio-
economic status and fertility when the group of "relatively fecund" couples was
taken as a whole. When the couples that spaced and planned their children were
considered as a separate group, a positive relation of economic security to the size
of completely planned families was conspicuous. Correlations of fertility with
personality characteristics such as feelings of personal adequacy, desire for freedom,
interest in children, and rationality of behavior, were disappointing. Where these
psychological motivations were found to relate to fertility, the relationship often
resulted from the joint function with socioeconomic status.
In general, the Indianapolis study did not make many new contributions to our
knowledge of personality variables as they relate to fertility; but it laid a ground-
work of methodology that will be of value in future studies.
In March 1955, Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell interviewed a national cross-
sectional sample of 2,713 married white women eighteen to thirty-nine years of
age. In contrast to the couples in the Indianapolis study, these women had been
for over ten years under the influence of the baby boom. The women were asked
how many children they expected to have in their completed families and how
they expected to achieve this size. The study found that fertility differentials have
not only diminished, but that "some of the differentials, such as those associated
with income, education, and place of residence, even show signs of disappearing."2
They found also a growing uniformity of attitude toward family size and an
almost universal approval of family limitation as well as its widespread and effective
practice by the white couples who need it.23 These, of course, offer a major ex-
planation for the diminution of differentials.
This study did not attempt to correlate individual personality characteristics
with fertility, probably because of the difficulty of defining and measuring these
traits. For what is probably the most comprehensive exploration of the relationship
between personality and fertility, we look at the third major study, that undertaken
by the Princeton University Office of Population Research, the results of which are
about to be published.24 This study sought, among other things, to isolate some
of the causal connections between fertility behavior and certain cultural and psycho-
logical variables.' After several pretest field surveys, the main investigation was
launched in late January 1957. It covered 1500 native white women, currently
and only once married, who had had their second child within six months of the
F FREEDMiAN ET AL., op. cit. supra note 3, at 273.
:'Id. at 401.
24 CHARLEs F. WESToFF, ROBERT F. POTTER, JR., PHILIP C. SAGI & ELLIOTT G. MISHLER, FAMILY
GROWTH IN METROPOLITAN AMmucA (to be published).
"1.Westoff, A New Study of American Fertility, 2 EuGENICS Q. 229 (1955).
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initial interview. Women with two children were selected on the assumption
that their expectations of completed family size will be a reasonably good predictor
of reproductive behavior in the near future. Eight personality variables were meas-
ured: i) anxiety, 2) nurturance (meaning helpful or sympathetic attitudes toward
others), 3) impulse-self-control balance, 4) self-acceptance and insight, 5) compulsive-
ness, 6) tolerance for ambiguity, 7) cooperativeness, and 8) need to achieve.
Again, the results are disappointing. For only three of the ten hypotheses re-
lating personality and fertility are the correlations statistically significant. These
three are manifest anxiety and compulsiveness, which are negatively associated with
fertility, meaning that people with these qualities tend to have fewer children; and
ambiguity, tolerance-i.e., tolerance for disorder, etc., which is positively related to
fertility. Even these three statistically significant correlations are so small, however,
as to account at best for only one per cent of the variance in number of children
desired.
In summary, the efforts made to date to find relationships between personality
and fertility have been disappointing. In three major studies covering large segments
of the population, no substantial correlations have been found between fertility
and traits of personality. Changes in the quality of the middle group who comprise
the great majority of our people may greatly affect the future of the country. But
we do not know what, if any, changes of this sort are taking place. We have ample
evidence that social and psychological factors of the environment affect people's
attitudes towards size of family. It would be strange if people of different types
reacted to these influences in just the same way.
c. Fertility at the lowest levels of quality. The mentally ill, the mentally deficient,
and the physically abnormal are at the lower levels of human quality. It is now
generally agreed that heredity plays a major part in most forms of mental illness and
in many forms of mental deficiency and physical abnormality. But we are not at
this time considering causes. Our concern is with the fertility of a group whose
children are bound to be injured by the low quality of their parents, whether by
reason of their poor heredity or because their parents will be unable to give them
proper care.
Until quite recently, the fertility of this group was a matter of opinion rather
than of knowledge, and that opinion took extreme and opposite forms. In the
middle of the nineteenth century, Morel expounded a doctrine of degeneration, under
which weaknesses, mild at first, became worse in each succeeding generation, until
the stock was wiped out by its inability to reproduce.2  At the turn of the century,
the opposite theory was widely held. Studies, later shown to be inadequate,
seemed to indicate that abnormal stocks were more fertile than the normal stocks
in the community. Fears were expressed by eugenists and others that the
-"B. A. MOREL, TRAITE DES DEGENERESCENCES PHYSIQUES, INTELLECTUELLES ET MORALES DE L'ESPEC9
HUMAINE [TREATISE ON THE PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL DEGENERATIONS OF THE HUMfAN SPECIES]
(1857).
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race was deteriorating, perhaps quite rapidly. But more recently, Dahlberg
in Sweden,2 7 Dayton in Massachusetts,2" Essen-MSller in Lund,29 Kallmann in
Germany,"0 and B65k 3' and Sheldon Reed and others32 in this country, using refined
statistical methods on larger samples, came to the conclusion that the fertility of the
mentally ill was in general lower than that of the rest of the population. Dr. Aubrey
Lewis summarized these findings in a recent article in the British Eugenics Review,
noting that,33
of the two commonest and gravest mental disorders, manic-depressive psychosis is char-
acterized by approximately normal fertility, and schizophrenia by much lower fertility than
normal, largely because of lessened capacity for marriage. Very little is known about
the fertility of people with neurotic disorders, but there is no evidence that it differs greatly
from the normal.
For a number of years the Dight Institute for Human Genetics at the University
of Minnesota has been conducting a study of the fertility of patients at the State
School for the Feebleminded and of the fertility of their relatives. This study was
summarized in 1954 in the following terms :'
We conclude that the genes for severe mental deficiencies behave in the same way as do
the genes for severe physical defects. They tend to be gradually eliminated from the
population and presumably are replaced by new mutations from normal genes.
This statement may not take sufficiently into account, however, the continuous dis-
tribution of deleterious genes by persons who are carriers.
If differential fertility is adversely affecting the quality of the population at the
present time, it would be that caused by a high rate of fertility among the larger
group of people who might be classed as the socially inadequate-those families who
are perennially on the relief rolls, the constant problem of the social worker. Un-
fortunately, our information on the fertility of this group is meager. It seems im-
possible to say at this time whether its rate of fertility is higher or lower than that
of the general population.
CONCLUSIONS
The control of death and, to a somewhat less extent, the control of fertility, are
now being practiced by perhaps a quarter of the world's population. These practices
are interdependent; we cannot for long have one without the other. Since people
" Dahlberg, Die Fruchtbarkeit der Geisteskranken [The Fertility of the Mentally Diseased], x44
Z'scm. f. d. GE. NEUROL. u. PSYcIAT. 427 (1933).
28 Dayton, Size of Family and Birth Order in Mental Disease, 24 STUDIES IN QUANTrrATIVE AND
CULTtAL SOcIOLOGY 123 (1930).
20 Essen-MWller, Mating and Fertility Patterns in Families with Schizophrenia, 6 EUGENICS Q. 142
(x959).
80 Fourz J. KaLmANN, THE GENETICS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA (1938).
21 B66k, Fertility Trends in Some Types of Mental Defects, 6 EuGENIcs Q. 113 (1959).
" S. C. Reed, E. NV. Reed, & Palm, Fertility and Intelligence Among Families of the Mentally Deficient,
I EUGENICS Q. 44 (i954).
"3 Lewis, Fertility and Mental Illness, 50 EUGENICS REV. 91 (1958).
O'S. C. Reed, E. W. Reed & Palm, supra note 32, at 52.
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everywhere want lower death rates, it seems likely that both practices will spread,
perhaps quite rapidly, throughout the whole world. It is, therefore, important to
examine what effect these practices may have on the quality of populations.
Historically, the control of deaths has always preceded an effective control of
births. Death rates go down first, birth rates go down later. During the period
of unbalance between the two, there are rapid increases in population. We have
recently witnessed just such an increase in the numbers of people of European
descent. Now their growth has stabilized at low levels of births and deaths. At
the same time, a similar cycle is beginning in Asia, Africa, Central and South
America, and the Arab states. As their numbers go up, the proportion of people of
different races and cultures is changing, and thus changing the aggregate quality
of the world population. These rapid increases in numbers also affect the quality of
the populations concerned, since they handicap the economic improvement necessary
for strengthening educational and cultural facilities.
In Europe, England, North America, Australia, and now in the Soviet Union
and Japan, deaths are uniformly at a low level, but there are still considerable
variations in the use and effectiveness of birth control. Some groups are increasing
in proportion to others, and these changes may have a considerable effect on quality.
But they are of a temporary nature. No final assessment of the effect of population
control on human quality can be made until both low death rates and low birth
rates are firmly established.
In the United States, the rapid growth of the past 200 years has been accompanied
by an even more rapid increase in production of goods and a constant advance in
the level of living. It is not possible to assess the part played by rapid growth alone.
With our present large population, it is likely that future growth may increasingly
have a retarding effect on the improvement of levels of living, and hence indirectly
on the quality of our people. But for a long time to come, this will be masked by
continuing increases in production.
Birth control started, in the United States, among high-income, educated, urban
groups, and spread gradually to people at lower levels of income and education and
to those on the farm. Even now, when eighty-five or ninety per cent of married
couples use some form of fertility control, contraception is less effective among the
less-educated, lower-income groups, so that there are still substantial variations in
rates of increase. Differentials seem to be narrowing, but the fact remains that at
the present time, one-fifth of our children are being brought up in homes with an
annual family income of less than $3,ooo. Since the educational level of parents and
the environment of the home are both affected by poverty of resources, there are
here serious implications of an injurious effect on the quality of the population,
springing from the unequal practice of birth control.
Recent studies of the effect of population control within the various socio-
economic classes give a somewhat hopeful picture of a trend that appears to be
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developing. At the upper levels of quality, the birth rates of men in Who's Who
and of college graduates appear now to be at or near replacement levels, as against
rates way below replacement levels thirty years ago. At the lowest levels of quality,
among the mentally deficient and defective, rates of reproduction appear to be low,
due in part to more time spent in institutions and to low marriage rates. In the great
middle group, who comprise most of our population, recent extensive studies have
developed hardly any information as to variations in fertility between couples with
different personal qualities. It is in this group that the quality of future generations
will be mainly determined. There is here an important field for further study.
Findings on fertility differentials in the United States during the past forty years
appear, in most cases, to indicate that they have done some injury to population
quality. But differentials in fertility are changing rapidly as birth control becomes
more widespread and more effective. New trends are appearing, and some of these
are distinctly favorable to the improvement of the quality of our people from one
generation to another.
According to Webster, eugenics is "the science which deals with influences, pri-
marily those admitting of social control, that improve inborn or hereditary qualities
in a series of generations of a race or breed, especially of the human race"; and
euthenics is "the science having to do with the betterment of living conditions to
secure more efficient human beings."'3 The effectiveness of eugenic and euthenic
programs will depend to a large extent on the direction of population trends. The
field of study of the effects of population control on population quality is in its in-
fancy. It is an interdisciplinary field, involving the demographer, the psychologist,
the economist, the social anthropologist, and the student of human genetics. In this
preliminary statement, little mention has been made of human genetics. There is at
present a large theoretical structure on the genetics of population, but little as yet
of specific information about variations in psychological characteristics. Knowledge
is increasing in all these fields. As this knowledge accumulates, and the interrela-
tions of its various aspects become better understood, the major importance of this
field will become increasingly recognized. Practical applications will begin to
emerge, and their direction may ultimately determine the future of the race.
NVETEs's NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTioNoRY UNArniDam, 880, 883 (2d ed. "95o).
